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Existing accounts of the sense of agency tend to focus on the proximal causal history
of the feeling. That is, they explain the sense of agency by describing the cognitive
mechanism that causes the sense of agency to be elicited. However, it is possible to
elicit an unconscious representation of one’s own agency that plays a different role in a
cognitive system. I use the “occasionality problem” to suggest that taking this distinction
seriously has potential theoretical pay-offs for this reason. We are faced, then, with a
need to distinguish instances of the representation of one’s own agency in which the
subject is aware of their sense of own agency from instances in which they are not. This
corresponds to a specific instance of what Dennett calls the “Hard Question”: once the
representation is elicited, then what happens? In other words, how is a representation of
one’s own agency used in a cognitive system when the subject is aware of it? How is
this different from when the representation of own agency remains unconscious? This
phrasing suggests a Functionalist answer to the Hard Question. I consider two single
function hypotheses. First, perhaps the representation of own agency enters into the
mechanisms of attention. This seems unlikely as, in general, attention is insufficient for
awareness. Second, perhaps, a subject is aware of their sense of agency when it is
available for verbal report. However, this seems inconsistent with evidence of a sense
of agency in the great apes. Although these two single function views seem like dead
ends, multifunction hypotheses such as the global workspace theory remain live options
which we should consider. I close by considering a non-functionalist answer to the Hard
Question: perhaps it is not a difference in the use to which the representation is put, but a
difference in the nature of the representation itself. When it comes to the sense of agency,
the Hard Question remains, but there are alternatives open to us.
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INTRODUCTION
In this paper I argue that we, as a community investigating
the sense of agency, are not doing enough to answer what
Dennett has called the “Hard Question” of consciousness. Our
existing models do a very good job of explaining when a rep-
resentation of own agency is elicited. I illustrate this with two
historically important accounts: the comparator model of Frith
et al. and Wegner et al. inference to apparent mental state
causation. Following Revonsuo, I consider these to be proxi-
mal etiological explanations. Although powerful so far as they
go, these accounts, on their own, do not provide us with the
explanatory resources to distinguish conscious and unconscious
representations of one’s own agency. This is not a problem we
can ignore. I use the “occasionality problem” to suggest that
there are potential theoretical benefits to taking this distinction
more seriously as conscious and unconscious representations of
own agency play very different roles in cognition. I conclude
by considering how we might approach the Hard Question for
the sense of agency. I consider two Functionalist approaches
(i) that a representation of own agency is conscious if it is
taken as the object of attention; and (ii) that a representation
of own agency is conscious if it is available for verbal report.
Although such approaches offer clear research agendas, both
of these specific approaches seem non-starters on empirical
grounds. That said multifunction hypotheses such as the global
workspace theory remain viable Functionalist positions. Finally
I consider a Vehicle theory approach to the Hard Question.
Such an approach also offers some clear research questions,
but currently no clear answers. As of now, the Hard Ques-
tion remains under-considered for the sense of agency even
though there exist a variety of questions we can ask to make
progress on it if we take either a Functionalist or a Vehi-
cle approach. These are questions we would all do well to
consider.
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STANDARD ACCOUNTS OF THE SENSE OF AGENCY
Standard explanations of the sense of agency are of a particular
type. Revonsuo (2006, pp. 20–22) calls this type of explanation
“proximal etiological explanation”. Such explanations have two
defining characteristics. First, they enumerate causes of the sense
of agency. Second, the explanations are cognitive explanations.
The specific causes posited are mental representations and com-
putations. To understand these accounts as explanations of the
sense of agency then, is to understand them as a description
of what aspects of the mind, i.e., mental representations and
computations, cause a subject to experience their own agency. The
sense of agency itself is taken to be just another representation in
this causal chain.
These traits are shared by prominent accounts of the sense of
agency. Consider first the comparator model. This model gets its
name from the use of three hypothetical comparisons performed
by the motor control system. Each of these comparisons performs
specific functions for motor control and motor learning (Wolpert
and Ghahramani, 2000). One of these comparisons also elicits
the sense of agency. This is the comparison that will concern us
here (for the full account and its broader applicability see Frith
et al., 2000a). On this model it is hypothesized that performing an
action requires the formation of a goal state or motor intention
(Pacherie, 2008), which represents where the body needs to move
to in order to perform the action. From this, the motor control
system formulates a motor command, which specifies how to
move the body from where it is to where it needs to be in
order to attain the goal. Two copies of the motor command are
formed; one is sent to the periphery and elicits the requisite
contractions of the effector muscles to perform the movement
needed to attempt the action. This movement, of course, affects
the sensory organs, allowing the motor control system to repre-
sent the movement after it occurs. The second copy of the motor
command, sometimes called the “efference copy” or “corollary
discharge”, is used by the motor system to form a prediction of
what sensory feedback will be received due to the action. This
predicted feedback can be used to represent the action as it occurs
(Frith et al., 2000a,b; Blakemore et al., 2002).
Now we get to the sense of agency. It is hypothesized that the
collection of representations and computations introduced above
cause the sense of agency to be elicited. Specifically when feedback
from the senses to the motor control system (actual sensory
feedback), matches an internally generated prediction of what this
feedback will be (predicted sensory feedback), a sense of agency is
elicited (Frith et al., 2000a, p. 1784). These two representations
matching in this context means that they represent the same
action. The comparator model has been considered a promising
explanation of the sense of agency and is able to explain some
important discoveries (for recent reviews of what and how see
Carruthers, 2012).
Wegner et al. have suggested that the sense of agency is elicited
by a rather different kind of computation. On their model, the
sense of agency is elicited when one infers that one or other of
one’s mental states caused the action of one’s body (Wegner and
Wheatley, 1999, p. 480; Wegner, 2003, p. 67). If correct, we can
provide a proximal etiological explanation of the sense of agency
by explaining how this inference is made. To make the inference
the subject needs to represent their mental states qua potential
causes of action, represent which body in the world is their own
(i.e., a sense of embodiment) and represent the action which is
occurring or has occurred. Next they must represent that one or
other mental state causes the action of their body. This is the role
of the inference to apparent mental state causation. According to
Wegner et al. this inference is made when three facts about the
relationship between the mental state and action are recognized.
First, the mental state must be consistent with the action in that
it specifies the action that actually occurs. Second, the mental
state must seem to occur at an appropriate time before the action
occurs, for example a memory of an action won’t be inferred as
a cause of that action. Third the thought must appear to be the
only possible cause of the action, i.e., if something else, another
person or gust of wind, say, could have caused the action then the
inference will not be made, or at least not made with a high degree
of certainty. Wegner et al. call these the principles of “consistency”,
“priority” and “exclusivity” respectively (Wegner and Wheatley,
1999, pp. 482–487; Wegner, 2003, p. 67). Like the comparator
model, this account has been considered a promising approach to
the sense of agency and it can explain some important discoveries
(see Wegner, 2002 for reviews; Carruthers, 2010).
Numerous authors have followed the general approach of these
classic hypotheses. Recently, several authors have proposed that
the sense of agency is elicited by a process that integrates the
output of several such computations (Synofzik et al., 2008, 2009;
Moore and Fletcher, 2012; Carruthers, in press). This work is
characterized by considerable progress in investigations into the
computations that elicit the sense of agency. However, there is
a limitation to this approach. Knowing how the representation
of agency is elicited doesn’t distinguish between cases where it is
elicited but remains unconscious and cases where it is elicited and
the subject is aware of it. Unless we are to view the sense of agency
as unique amongst all mental representations in that it can only
ever be conscious, we must allow for the possibility of a repre-
sentation of own agency to be elicited and remain unconscious.
In the next section I consider the occasionality problem which
has been presented as an objection to the comparator model,
but which is generalizable to other accounts. I use this as an
example to show that taking seriously the distinction between
unconscious representations and a conscious sense of agency can
have theoretical pay-offs in this area as each of these play different
roles in the broader cognitive system. In particular I suggest that
if we take this distinction seriously then the occasionality problem
doesn’t arise.
THE OCCASIONALITY PROBLEM AND UNCONSCIOUS
REPRESENTATIONS OF ONE’S OWN AGENCY
It would, I take it, be bizarre if there were no unconscious
representations of own agency. But, is there any theoretical benefit
for sense of agency research as it it currently done to considering
this fact explicitly? In this section I argue that there is. That
by considering the different roles conscious and unconscious
representations of own agency play, in particular that only the
absence conscious representations can be noticed by the subject,
we can avoid the “occasionality problem”. In the next section I
consider some ways in which we might attempt to explain the
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difference between conscious and unconscious representations of
own agency. The occasionality problem, it should be noted, was
originally formulated as an objection to the comparator model,
but it applies equally to Wegner et al. account described above.
To see the problem we first need to take a step back and consider
clinical phenomena that the above models need to explain.
One of the central explananda for the accounts introduced
above is thought to be delusions of alien control. This delusion,
commonly seen as a symptom of schizophrenia, is a patient’s belief
that not they, but rather some other agent, control the patient’s
actions. This is expressed in reports such as:
I felt like an automaton, guided by a female spirit who had entered
me during it [an arm movement].
I thought you [the experimenter] were varying the movements
with your thoughts.
I could feel God guiding me [during an arm movement] (Spence,
2001, p. 165).
There is a growing consensus that explanations focusing on
the sense of agency alone cannot explain every feature of this
delusion (Synofzik et al., 2008; Carruthers, 2009). In particu-
lar, such accounts do not have the resources to explain why
patients attribute the action to another specific agent. What
such accounts can explain is why patients fail to attribute their
actions to themselves. According to the comparator model, in
healthy subjects the comparison between actual and predicted
sensory feedback causes a sense of agency to be elicited for
actions the subject performs. However, it is hypothesized that this
computation goes wrong for the patient suffering delusions of
alien control. They do not represent a match between predicted
and actual sensory feedback when they should and so no sense
of agency is elicited. Without this sense, the patient has no
experiential basis for a self-attribution of action- they do not feel
as though they perform the action- and so actions are not self-
attributed. For those interested in the details of why this occurs,
there is some experimental evidence that these patients have an
underlying deficit in forming or using predicted sensory feed-
back (Frith and Done, 1989; Blakemore et al., 2000; Carruthers,
2012).
As with the comparator model, Wegner et al. inference to
apparent mental state causation is unlikely to explain every feature
of this delusion. Like the comparator model it may offer an
account of how the sense of agency is lost. According to this view
the sense of agency would be lost when one of the principles
of priority, exclusivity or consistency is not met. I have argued
elsewhere (forthcoming) that on this model it is reasonable to
hypothesize that it is the principle of priority which is violated,
as there is some evidence that patients suffering from delusions
of alien control display abnormalities in the representation of the
timing of their actions (Voss et al., 2010).
Now we are in a position to examine the occasionality problem
(de Vignemont and Fourneret, 2004; Proust, 2006, p. 89; Synofzik
et al., 2008). This problem starts from the observation that those
suffering from delusions of alien control only attribute some of
their actions to other agents. None of the models above appear
to have, on their own, the resources to explain this observa-
tion. At the core of this objection is an accusation of a false
prediction. A model like the comparator model predicts patients
lack a sense of agency for their actions because they cannot
represent a match at the comparison between actual and predicted
sensory feedback. This does not offer us principled grounds for
distinguishing those actions that the patient self-attributes and
those that they attribute to others. If the comparison fails then
the model should predict that patients lack a sense of agency
for all of their actions. This is not the case, so the comparator
model appears to be incorrect. This problem arises again when we
consider Wegner et al. account. Hypothesizing that these patients
fail to represent their own agency for their actions because they
misrepresent the timing of their actions (thus violating the prin-
ciple of priority) again fails to explain why only some actions
are misattributed. In essence these accounts suggest that such
patients always lack a representation of their own agency, but
it seems that this lack only matters to the subject some of the
time.
de Vignemont and Fourneret, (2004, p. 9) have suggested that
the system which elicits the sense of agency, whether it be the
comparator model or something else, fails only occasionally and
in a context specific way. If it is true that the comparator or
inference to apparent mental state causation face intermittent
failures, then the occasionality problem disappears. However, the
questions of how and why the mechanism occasionally fails have
not been answered and nothing about the actions themselves or
features such as their personal significance affect whether or not
they are self-attributed (Proust, 2006, p. 89). More importantly
there is no evidence independent of reports of the delusion
that the comparator model or the representation of the timing
of actions fails only occasionally for such patients. Until such
evidence is forthcoming it is difficult for this solution to shake
the appearance of being ad hoc and it is worth considering other
accounts. More so, as I will suggest below, if we consider the
different roles conscious and unconscious representations of own
agency play in cognition, which we should do anyway, then there
is no need to add additional assumptions of this type.
An argument from the occasionality problem against the
hypotheses described, like that sketched above, assumes that the
result of the process leading to a representation of own agency is a
conscious sense of agency. If we drop this assumption the problem
needn’t arise. To see why this assumption is being made let us
consider the relationship between experiences and delusions. So,
what is the evidence that patients suffering delusions of alien
control lack a sense of agency? One might be tempted to think
that they say so. But, this isn’t typically the case. Rather a deficit in
a conscious sense of agency is inferred from the fact that patients
attribute their own actions to another agent. This inference is
justified by some standard assumptions in the study of delusions.
The state of the art in delusions research is strongly influenced
by Maher (1988, 1974) hypothesis that delusions are attempts
to explain anomalous experience. Now there may be controversy
regarding whether this explanatory attempt involves normal or
deficient reasoning (Davies et al., 2002; Gerrans, 2002), but both
sides agree that the delusion arises from an attempt to make sense
of an anomalous experience. This supposition is not universally
accepted, of course (Campbell, 2001; Bayne and Pacherie, 2004),
but what matters here is that this assumption is needed if we
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are to justify inferring that patients lack a sense of agency from
their acts of other attribution. We can justify this inference if
the lack of a sense of agency is the anomalous experience which
the delusion of alien control is an attempt to make sense of. So
first, why should the absence of a sense of agency be an anomaly
that needs to be explained? Well, it would be, if a conscious
sense of agency typically accompanied one’s actions. If this is
the case, we would expect that its absence would be noticed and
felt to be in need of explanation. After all, if one feels one’s
body move, but one does not seem to be the agent behind the
movement, then one would naturally search for a reason that one
moved.
We see this assumption that there is a conscious sense of
agency accompanying all actions at play in the argument from
the occasionality problem. The general failure of a process like
the comparator should mean that the sense of agency that is
usually present is not. This is an anomaly to be explained by the
patient. The patient should show delusions of alien control for
all of their actions, but they do not, therefore the comparator
model (or which ever process we are considering) is false, quod
erat demonstrandum (QED).
To avoid this conclusion, all we need do is drop the assump-
tion that a conscious sense of agency always accompanies our
actions. Instead, we need only hypothesize that a representation
of own agency which may or may not be conscious accompa-
nies our actions. In other words, the output of processes like
the comparator or inference to apparent mental state causation
is a representation of the subject’s agency which is sometimes
conscious and sometimes not. An absence of a sense of agency
is thus not always an anomaly which the patient need explain.
An absence of representation is not a representation of absence,
as the saying goes, and it is particularly not a representation of
absence to the subject. It is the subject noticing (i.e., represent-
ing to themselves) that the sense of agency is absent which is
hypothesized to lead to delusions of alien control, not it’s mere
absence. This noticing of the absence will occur when the sense of
agency is expected and so we might say the absence of a sense of
agency is only an anomaly when the subject expects to experience
it.
A possible objection to this line of response is to assert, based
on introspection, that a conscious sense of agency accompanies
all of our actions in the normal case. As such, it is always
expected and any absence is an anomaly to be explained. However,
introspection gives us poor grounds to assume that there is a
ubiquitous sense of agency. What would lead one to assume
that there is a conscious sense of agency accompanying every
action? We can see where this assumption comes from, and
how poorly grounded it is, by an analogy with visual conscious-
ness. A favorite example purporting to show that we are not
conscious of as much as we think we are comes from Dennett
(1991). This example is so easy to replicate that given minimal
resources you can do it yourself right now. All you need is a
well shuffled deck of playing cards. Stare at a point on a wall
in front of you. It is important that you continue to stare at
this point throughout the entire demonstration. Without looking
randomly select a card and hold it out to one side at arm’s
length. Gradually move it toward the center of your vision. At
what point can you see the color and number on the card? The
typical finding is that it is only about 2 or 3◦1 from the point
one is looking at that these features become visible (Dennett,
1991, p. 54). The reason for this is to do with the nature of
photoreceptors outside of the fovea on the retina and need not
concern us here. What I wish to draw attention to, however, is
that on first experiencing this demonstration most people seem
surprised (Dennett, 1991, p. 68). Pre-theoretically, we expect to
be able to discriminate objects easily when they are presented
in our peripheral vision. Dennett suggests, and I agree, that
this expectation is based on a folk-theoretical belief that vision
presents us with a relatively uniformly clear and colored world
in which objects are easily distinguished. But, as this simple
demonstration shows, as do other more rigorous experiments,
e.g., Brooks et al. (1980), this is at best only true of the foveated
world, and even then with some exceptions (Caplovitz et al.,
2008).2
Why do we believe this is true of our peripheral vision? We
can speculate on many possible reasons for this. One reason
might be that things we use as public representations of what we
see, e.g., photographs or videos, are somewhat like this. There
may be a misbegotten analogy between visual depictions and
visual experience. Another more universal proposal comes from
Schwitzgebel (2008: p. 255) as well as Dennett (1991: p. 68)
who suggests that objects in our peripheral vision appear distinct
and colored because they are when we look at them. Whenever
one looks to see what object is in one’s periphery one finds it
clear, distinct and colored. As such we tend to assume that we
always experience those objects as such. This claim provides us
with a useful analogy for understanding why accounts like the
comparator model and Wegner et al. inference to apparent mental
state causation needn’t suppose that a conscious sense of agency
accompanies every action.
If a model like one of those above is right, then it would be true
that our actions are normally accompanied by a representation
of our own agency. However, the subject need not be aware
of their own agency. The representation could be unconscious
but, because the representation is formed with every action, it is
there whenever we go “looking” for it, or more generally when
it is expected to occur to the subject, i.e., consciously. Just as
objects in our periphery always appear clear, distinct and colored
when we go looking for them, our representation of agency is
always experienced when we go looking for it, thus meeting our
expectations. Just as this may lead us to believe that objects in our
periphery always appear clear, distinct and colored, this may lead
us to believe we always experience a sense of agency accompanying
our actions rather than merely representing it.
1As a rough guide 1 degree is approximately the angle subtended by a point
either side of your thumb nail held at arms length.
2Now of course in the normal case our eyes saccade constantly allowing us to
build a much more detailed visual representation than is possible from staring
at a fixation point making the area of clear vision significantly larger than the
2 to 3◦ observable in a fixation task. This doesn’t affect the central Dennettian
claim that periphery is not clear and colored in the way that we would typically
assume. Nor do we typically reflect on how much moving our eyes is necessary
for seeing the way we do.
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Accepting this conclusion then, the comparator model or the
inference to apparent mental state causation need not suppose
that representing one’s own agency is always a conscious sense of
agency. Still, one may wonder, how exactly does this affect the
occasionality problem? After all, it would still seem to be the case
that these models predict that the unconscious representation
of agency would be missing for every action performed by the
patient suffering delusions of alien control, so should the model
still predict that the patient would show the delusion for every
action?
The answer to this is no. However, to see why, we need to
return to the purported role of consciousness in the formation
of delusions such as delusions of alien control. Recall Maher’s
proposal that delusions are attempts to make sense of anomalous
experiences. In the case we are interested in here, the delusion of
alien control arises because the patient attempts to make sense of
the absence of a sense of agency. They expect a sense of agency,
but it is not there when they “look”, giving rise to an anomalous
experience that must be explained. On this view then, an absent
sense of agency is only anomalous when it is expected. A subject
would not notice the absence of an unconscious representation.
It is only when the representation would otherwise become con-
scious that its absence would be noticeable. Again the absence
of the representation is not the same as the subject representing
to themselves that something is absent. The upshot of this is
that if we hypothesize that the comparator or inference produces
an unconscious representation of agency, which only becomes
conscious when it is needed by the subject (say in self-recognition
or introspecting to see what experiences one has), we find that the
occasionality problem is no problem at all.
It is not so much that the problem is solved as it doesn’t arise
in the first place, all because conscious and unconscious repre-
sentations of own agency play different roles in cognition. Only
conscious representations can be expected by the subject, and only
their absence can be noticed by the subject. The normal case is
that actions are not accompanied by a conscious sense of agency
(only an unconscious representation) and so a lack of this feeling
is typically not an anomaly that the patient suffering delusions of
control needs to explain. It is only when they would “look for”
(however this analogy is to be cashed out mechanistically—see
below) this representation that it is expected and so its absence is
an anomaly that needs to be explained.
This consideration of the occasionality problem shows us
that there are theoretical benefits to taking seriously the distinc-
tion between conscious and unconscious representations of own
agency. By doing so and considering the different roles conscious
and unconscious representations play in cognition we see that the
occasionality problem doesn’t arise. As such we don’t need to add
assumptions to our models, such as assuming that they only fail
some of the time, which lack supporting evidence. However, we
do have a new set of issues to consider. What then is the analogy
of “looking for” the representation of agency that produces the
expectation of the sense of agency needed to explain delusions of
alien control? This question is no less than what distinguishes an
unconscious representation of agency from a conscious sense of
agency, and this is what Dennett has called the “Hard Question”
of consciousness.
THE HARD QUESTION
The approach to the sense of agency used by traditional accounts
such as the comparator model and the inference to mental state
causation are only designed to answer one question about the
sense of agency: how is a representation of one’s own agency
elicited? This is a vitally important question in the study of the
sense of agency, but to think it is the only question is to treat
awareness as the end of the line of a computation, the dreaded
Cartesian Theatre, and to deny the possibility of an unconscious
representation of one’s own agency. In addition to this question,
we also need to ask of accounts of agency what Dennett calls the
“Hard Question” [not to be confused with any purported “Hard
Problems” (Chalmers, 2003)3]: after the representation of own
agency is elicited by one or other of these mechanisms, well, then
what happens (Dennett, 1991, p. 255)? What is the difference
between a representation of my own agency of which I become
aware and one that languishes forever in the apparent irrelevance
of unconsciousness?
The analogy employed above of “looking” for the sense of
agency suggests one possible answer. Perhaps an unconscious
representation of agency becomes a conscious representation
when the subject’s attention is directed to it? In the following
section I consider and discuss this possibility. Having found
this wanting, I consider a further possibility, that the answer
to the Hard Question is that the representation enters into the
mechanisms required for verbal report. I argue that this answer is
also unsatisfactory, as it is inconsistent with behavioral evidence
of a sense of agency in non-verbal animals. These first two options
are Functionalist theories. They propose that consciousness is
playing a certain role in cognition. Although these two specific
proposals seem to fail on empirical grounds it is important to
note that other Functionalist theories, notably those that identify
consciousness with multiple functional roles remain open. Finally,
I propose a radical alternative suggesting that the answer to
the Hard Question is to be found not in the uses to which
representations are put within a cognitive system, but in the
nature of the representations themselves. Regardless of which of
the two research agendas individuals chose to pursue, it is clear
that we do not have an answer to the Hard Question for the
sense of agency nor do we spend enough time thinking about
it.
ATTENTION
One potential answer to the Hard Question is attention. Such
an answer is suggested by well-known cases of inattentional
blindness, where subjects fail to see perfectly obvious stimuli
(like a woman in a gorilla suit) simply because their attention
is directed elsewhere (Mack and Rock, 1998). More specifically,
3The supposed “Hard Problem” of consciousness is the problem of explaining
how mental and physical states give rise to conscious experience, given that
it seems that no explanation in terms of the structure or function of mental
states is sufficient to explain this (Chalmers, 2003). This is a problem closely
tied with mysterian and dualistic approaches to consciousness. In contrast the
“Hard Question” is a question within the materialist tradition, which works
from arguments that a structural or functional explanation of consciousness
is possible in principle, and asks what is the difference between a conscious
and unconscious mental representation.
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let us hypothesize that the difference between an unconscious
representation of agency and the conscious sense of agency is that
the conscious representation is attended to. If this is true then we
would have a clear research agenda: understand how and why a
representation of agency is selected or not selected for attention
and understand the mechanisms of attention.
Such a view has not been developed in detail for the sense
of agency; indeed, I am suggesting here that consideration of
the Hard Question with respect to the sense of agency has
been neglected almost entirely. Notwithstanding, attention based
accounts of consciousness do have some currency in the explana-
tion of perceptual consciousness. Prinz (2000, 2012), for example,
advocates such a view. Unfortunately evidence is mounting that
attention is not a good answer to the Hard Question, at least not
on its own, as attention is not sufficient for consciousness. That
is, subjects can attend to things of which they are not conscious.
Here I discuss one well-studied example.
Norman et al. (2013) have provided compelling evidence that
subjects can visually attend to objects, namely two-dimensional
shapes, even when they cannot consciously see those objects.
They start from prior observations of the effects of taking two-
dimensional shapes as the objects of attention in color discrimi-
nation tasks. In these tasks, subjects are asked to indicate with a
button press the color of a circle. Before the target colored circle
appears a supraliminal spatial cue is presented. In the trials of
interest here the, cue appears some distance from where the target
circle will ultimately appear. However, it may appear in the same
shape as the cue or a different shape. See Figure 1 for an example
layout.
When the target appears in the same object as the cue, response
times are facilitated (Egly et al., 1994). Norman et al. take this as
characteristic of attention to such shapes.
Norman et al. repeated this experiment, but made the shapes
invisible. They presented on a screen an array of Gabor patches
whose orientation rapidly alternated between vertical and hori-
zontal. Within the array rectangles were defined by Gabor patches
flickering out of phase with the remainder of the array (Norman
et al., 2013, p. 838). When the background patches were vertical,
those defining the rectangle were horizontal, and vice versa.
Observing the array subjects reported seeing flickering Gabor
patches, but were unable to see the rectangles. Indeed, subjects
were no better than chance when asked to guess whether or
not such flickering displays contained rectangles (Norman et al.,
2013, p. 840). Despite the invisibility of the shapes there was a
facilitation effect in the color discrimination task characteristic
of attention being directed at the shapes. That is, subjects were
faster at responding to targets which appeared in the same shape
as the cue, than for targets which appeared the same distance
from the cue but in a different shape (Norman et al., 2013,
p. 839).
In this study we see an effect characteristic of attention being
directed at an object, despite the object being invisible. This
demonstrates that subjects can attend to shapes of which they are
not conscious. In general, this also suggests that attention is not
sufficient for consciousness. Without a reason to think that the
sense of agency will be an exception to this, it seems unlikely that
attention will answer the Hard Question for the sense of agency.
FIGURE 1 | The spatial layout of the stimuli. In the center we see a
fixation cross, above and below are two rectangles. A cue appears at the x
and disappears, followed by a target at one of the two circles. The subject’s
task is to indicate the color of the target. Subjects respond faster to cues
appearing within the same shape as the cue, even though they are as far
from the cue as the target in the other shape.
REPORTABILITY
Often we take it that we can be confident that a subject experiences
something if they are able to verbally report it. Although such
reports are susceptible to a variety of introspective omissions
and commissions (Dennett, 1991, p. 96; Schwitzgebel, 2008), in
practise, verbal reports (especially questionnaire responses) are
very often treated as the best way to operationalize experience.
Indeed the theories of the sense of agency introduced above are
built on studies using questionnaires to ask subjects to report
their experiences of agency. At the heart of this approach lies
an intuition that, however imperfectly, we are able to talk about
those things that we experience, but not those things that reside
in our unconscious minds. This intuition suggests an approach to
the Hard Question: perhaps the difference between conscious and
unconscious representations is just that conscious representations
are available for report. Although such an approach would be
highly controversial (Block, 2007), there is no approach to the
Hard Question that is not controversial, and this proposal remains
live.
That said, we do have strong reason to doubt that it is
reportability that distinguishes conscious and unconscious repre-
sentations of own agency, as there are many non-verbal animals
that display evidence of experiencing a sense of agency. This
suggests that being available for verbal report is not necessary for
a conscious sense of agency.
Good evidence for this comes from the mirror self-recognition
test. This test, first proposed by Gallup (1970), involves marking
an animal surreptitiously (usually when anesthetized) with a
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non-irritating, odorless dye on a part of the animal’s body that
cannot be seen without a mirror (such as the forehead). An animal
is deemed to pass the mirror self recognition test if there is a
significant increase in mark directed behavior coincident with
the animal observing itself in the mirror (Gallup, 1970, p. 87).
Such behavior indicates that the animal has recognized itself in
the mirror as it uses the mirror to direct actions towards itself. A
sense of agency is needed to pass such tests. To learn to recognize
oneself in a mirror one needs to realize that the actions one
sees in the mirror are equivalent to the actions one is currently
performing (Povinelli, 2001, p. 855). In order to recognize oneself
in a mirror, then, one needs to know (amongst many other things)
what action one is performing. This is a function of the sense
of agency (Povinelli and Cant, 1995). As such, passing the test is
good evidence for a sense of agency.
Where this creates a problem for using reportability as an
answer to the Hard Question is in the fact that many non-
verbal animals pass the mirror self-recognition test. This includes
chimpanzees (Gallup, 1970), orang-utans, human raised gorillas
(Povinelli and Cant, 1995), bottlenose dolphins (Marten and
Psarakos, 1994) and European magpies (Prior et al., 2008). These
animals thus show evidence of experiencing a conscious sense
of agency. As such, verbal report does not seem necessary for
consciousness, and thus investigating how unconscious represen-
tations of agency become available for verbal report is a non-
starter as a solution to the Hard Question.
The solutions considered so far to the Hard Question are
Functionalist theories. They posit that for a representation to
be conscious is for it to be used a certain way, say be being
attended to or by being made available for report. On such
views it is use which constitutes consciousness. Whilst the two
options considered here do seem like non-starters, there are
other Functionalist theories available. Other accounts, such as
Dennett (1991) multiple drafts model Dennett (1991) or Baars
(1988) global workspace Baars (1988), suggest that conscious-
ness is not a single use within a cognitive system, but rather
a conglomeration of many uses and these options remain live.
My point here is not to solve the problem of what distin-
guishes conscious and unconscious representations, but merely
to suggest that in sense of agency research this is a problem
we should spend more time on. Next, I turn to a theoretical
basis for approaching the Hard Question that offers a funda-
mentally different kind of solution to the options considered
so far.
VEHICLE THEORIES
Vehicle theories of consciousness answer the Hard Question in
a rather different way. The key issue we are getting at is: what
is the difference between an unconscious and a conscious repre-
sentation of own agency? The proposals considered thus far have
followed Dennett in hypothesizing that this difference is a differ-
ence between how unconscious and conscious representations are
processed (e.g., are they subject to attention or made available for
verbal report). In other words the difference is a matter of what is
done with the representation. Such approaches are Functionalist
theories in that they consider the particular use of a representation
within a cognitive system to constitute that representation’s being
conscious.
Vehicle theories, in contrast, hypothesize that the difference
between conscious and unconscious representations is not how
they are processed, but in the nature of the representation itself
(O’Brien and Opie, 1999, p. 128). The nature of conscious
vehicles of representation (also known as representation bearers)
is hypothesized to be different to the nature of unconscious
representing vehicles. On such views consciousness is a way of
representing the world using different kinds of vehicle than those
used by unconscious representations. On this kind of view the
answer to the Hard Question is not “and then some additional
processing occurs” but rather, “and then the vehicle of represen-
tation is changed from one form to another”.
O’Brien and Opie propose a general answer to this ques-
tion making use of distinctions in kinds of representing vehi-
cles offered by Dennett (1982). In particular they focus on
a distinction between “explicit” representations which are:
“physically distinct objects, each possessed of a single semantic
value” (O’Brien and Opie, 1999, p. 133) and “potentially explicit”
and “tacit”4 representations which are to be understood in terms
of a computational system’s capacity to make certain information
explicit in the above sense. In general, O’Brien and Opie hypoth-
esize that we are conscious of all and only things that are repre-
sented in an explicit form. All unconscious representations would
then take the form of potentially explicit or tacit representations.
According to this version of a Vehicle Theory, a conscious sense
of agency would be an explicit representation of own agency.
That is, a discrete vehicle, such as a stable pattern of activity
across a layer of neurons (O’Brien and Opie, 1999, p. 138), with
that content. An unconscious representation of agency would
not be a discrete vehicle, but a disposition in the cognitive sys-
tem to produce such a representation. To allow for unconscious
representations of own agency on such a view, the output of
the comparator model or Wegner et al. inference needs to be
reconceived. It is not an explicit representation of own agency, but
rather a change in the dispositions of a computational system to
produce such a representation.
If such an approach is correct then we have a new way to
approach the Hard Question for the sense of agency. How is
the output of the comparator model, or whichever account we
ultimately agree on, made explicit? Why is it the case that it
is sometimes not made explicit? Is this a matter of the subject
metaphorically “looking for” it, if so, how would that be under-
stood more literally?
The benefit of taking this approach is that it offers a new kind
of answer to the Hard Question by offering a new conception of
what properties of a computational system distinguish conscious
from unconscious representations. With this reconceptualization
we can deploy O’Brien and Opie’s hypothesis for the sense of
4There are differences between “potentially explicit” and “tacit” representa-
tions. These differences become important when we consider the kinds of
computations being performed within a cognitive system, but won’t play
a role in this short statement of O’Brien and Opie’s hypothesis regarding
consciousness (indeed O’Brien and Opie argue that a Vehicle Theory could
only be true for connectionist systems and that the “potentially explicit” versus
“tacit” distinction does not apply to such systems).
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agency and answer the Hard Question in a way that doesn’t seem
to be falsified like the other answers considered here. In addition,
a research agenda is set: why and how is a representation of own
agency sometimes made explicit? Of course this question has not
yet been answered. Indeed whichever form of the Hard Question
we prefer it is clear that we have not yet answered it, although
there seem to be two promising avenues to approach it. And so
I implore us, as a community to ask of ourselves, now that we
have made progress in understanding how a representation of
own agency is elicited, then what happens?
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have argued that in order to explain the sense of
agency we need to move beyond proximal etiological explanations
and consider the Hard Question. Although such accounts, includ-
ing the comparator model and the inference to apparent mental
sate causation, are powerful so far as they go, they fail to distin-
guish between conscious and unconscious representations of own
agency. As a consideration of the occasionality problem suggests,
not only is this a real distinction, but such representations can
play very different roles in cognition. Finally, I have suggested
that there are ways we can approach the Hard Question, and
although some of the specifics of certain particular approaches
might seem like non-starters on empirical grounds it should be
clear that there are alternative approaches, both Functionalist
and vehicle, available and specific questions to ask. Now what
happens?
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